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Abstract
The ratio of unemployed to vacancies has risen sharply in the UK after the recession of
2008/09. How harmful is it for the long run growth, equity and e¢ ciency and what sorts of
long run cycles does it generate in the economy? With a dynamic computable general equilib-
rium model with Pissarides (1979, 2011) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) type equilibrium
unemployment, impacts of tax-transfer programmes are assessed for the UK. The model con-
tains more desirable structure of households and production sectors and includes more type of
shocks in preferences, technology, trade and policy instruments for stochastic analyses than is
usual in DSGE models. It assesses growth and cycles as well as equity and e¢ ciency e¤ects
of policies simultaneously. Improvements in the matching technology lowers the equilibrium
unemployment and raises the long-run growth rate and life time utilities of households and re-
duces long run cycles. Matching could be made more e¢ cient by inuencing the relative price
system by optimal set of tax and transfer instruments. Better matching techniques can make
transition of job-seekers to employment more e¢ cient so that the intertemporal labour-leisure
and consumption-saving decisions have greater impacts on growth and redistribution reducing
uctuations in the economy.
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1 Introduction
Market clearing is central to the fundamental theorems of welfare analysis and Pareto optimality
conditions for determining the e¢ cient allocation of resources and distribution of income in the
classical Walrasian general equilibrium model. However, the existence of unemployed job-seekers
(even their persistent unemployment) is a fact of real life in almost all economies around the world.
Ignoring millions of unemployed job seekers and overlooking the consequences for welfare goes
against the principle of choosing the best policy alternative which maximizes social welfare. There
can be little debate that the process of job creation and destruction and the hiring of workers
through the matching process between the skills of job seekers and requirement of employers (job
creators) should be an integral part of any dynamic general equilibrium analysis if we want to
shed light on the adjustment process required for the long run e¢ ciency and growth in modern
economies.
Economists have incorporated unemployment as a feature of the equilibrium process in the
modelling of an economy for some time. Job matching and search models developed by Pissarides
(1979) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) signicantly contributed to the analysis of unem-
ployment dynamics based on bargaining and matching for wages and jobs by workers and rms.
Pissarides (2011) provides intuitive reasoning behind the matching function (Beveridge curve) and
wage curves in the unemployment and vacancy (u, v) space to compare equilibrium positions in the
expansionary, normal and recessionary phases in the UK and US labour markets. Pissarides (2013)
illustrates how the UK, USA and OECD labour markets moved along the Beveridge curve between
2007 and 2009 but were unable to achieve the e¢ cient equilibrium points after 2008 recession be-
cause of macroeconomic rigidities in Europe and microeconomic rigidities in the US. In the last
decade, the new Keynesian DSGE models have been extended to assess the impacts of various mea-
sures designed to reduce the labour market frictions in the dynamics of ination and its volatility
with both rm-union bargaining (Zanetti (2007), Gertler and Trigari (2009)) and search-matching
a la Mortensen and Pissarides (see for example Kraus and Lubik (2007), Zanetti (2011), Faccini,
Millard and Zanetti (2013)). While Thomas and Zanetti (2009) found insignicant impacts of re-
ducing unemployment benets and ring costs on ination volatility in the Euro area, Campolmi
and Faia (2011) measure the welfare losses due to such volatility. Thus these measures designed to
reduce the labour market frictions did not cause more ination volatility and did not have welfare
costs more than 0.3 percent of GDP. Michaillat (2012) argued that in recessions job-rationing is
more important than matching frictions: however, Pissarides (2013) strongly favours the search and
matching model than the job rationing model for analysis of recessions as it is not only simple and
more appealing but can also explain the emerging trends across countries.
Whilst these recent non-Walrasian developments are very much to be welcomed, in a standard
DSGE model the focus is exclusively on short run "business cycle" uctuations around a steady-state
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in a representative household setting. We believe that the DGSE framework is lacking in certain
key dimensions. First, these models shed no light on the long run general equilibrium impacts
of tax-transfer policies on equilibrium unemployment, growth, capital accumulation among various
sectors of the economy and the utility, wages and labour supply of households into the future.
Secondly, the micro-foundations are very simple and abstract from diversity across households and
production sectors, with no role for relative prices and wages by sectors of production and skill
categories of labour (see Merz (1995), Hutton and Ruocco (1999), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007)).
In this paper, we seek to extend the computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework to allow
a full analysis of equilibrium unemployment in a dynamic general equilibrium model with heteroge-
nous households and rms, providing the structural details required for more realistic analysis of
the allocation mechanism in the economy. It aims to contribute to the existing literature in these
two directions with a focus on its application to the UK economy. The framework we develop
provides a medium and long-term framework for evaluating and understanding economic policy as
opposed to the short-run focus of standard new Keynesian DGSE models. The main contribution
of this paper lies in providing greater degree of micro-foundations for a dynamic general equilibrium
model in which relative prices of commodities and wage rates across skill categories and marginal
productivities across rms, tax and transfer policies feature in determining the path of equilibrium
unemployment. It considers the full impacts of the equilibrium rate of unemployment on labour
supply, consumption and saving behavior by deciles of households in three di¤erent state of labour
market and inequality in earnings and income emerging from the competitive equilibrium process
in the economy. It also shows how the job market matching evolves alongside the investment and
capital accumulation behavior of rms and the resulting relative prices of commodities and factors
of production in the broader economy.
The job search and matching component is put in the dynamic equilibrium framework developed
by Bhattarai (2007a) to assess impacts of various scal policy measures including VAT, income and
production taxes and transfers in the system of relative prices and allocations of resources as well
as on the evolution of the economy. This issue is investigated here by comparing results of the
equilibrium unemployment dynamic computable general equilibrium annual model (EUDCGEM)
under the tax reform schemes as proposed after the current recession. The model is benchmarked
to the 2009 micro-consistent input-output data of the UK economy. The reference dynamic path
of the model is computed for a long horizon of 2100 in order to see the long run cycle and growth
simultaneously and to study the evolution of economy over time and to know what options future
generations will have if the current policies and institutions were to continue. The model with
heterogeneity among households and rms nds the dynamically e¢ cient and optimal path of the
price and wage system of the economy given the preferences and technologies of households and rms
who interact with scal policy choices of the government. Results of inows in and outows from
the unemployment give features of negatively sloped Beveridge-UV curve (Fig. 5) and positively
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sloped wage curves. Empirical analysis shows that more vacancies occur when unemployment is
lower. Positively sloped wage-VS curve (Fig. 6) are observable when the sectoral job mismatches
cause a rise in the number of vacancies despite larger numbers of unemployed job seekers. This is
the rst paper to model the general equilibrium impacts of such phenomenon with heterogeneous
rms and skills for the UK economy.
2 Stylized facts of UK Labour Market
Since the focus of the current paper is to study the implications of equilibrium unemployment
in the economy, four stylized facts, based on time series data on unemployment, vacancies and
redundancies in the UK from the O¢ ce of the National Statistics (ONS) are worth considering.
Fact 1: Inow and outow rates have changed over time with resultant changes in the equilibrium
unemployment rate. Literature suggests that outow rates were more important determinants of
unemployment than inow rates till 1990 but the job separation rates have become more important
after the recent recession. These two factors explain how the overall rate of unemployment had
gone up from around 4 percent in early 1970s up to 12 percent in around 1984 and remained at
fairly higher level till mid 1990s and declining gradually towards 5 percent around 2007 (Fig. 1).
Recent studies including Pissarides (2013), Smith (2011), Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008) have
attributed these pre-2007 trends to less frictions in the labour market due to structural reforms on
benets, taxes and trainings under the Thatcherian or the New Deal programmes in the last three
decades. However, after the nancial crisis in 2008, the unemployment rate rose to 8.4 percent in
November 2011 (2.6 million) because of higher separation rates triggered by the recession against
lower outow rates as vacancies were less than 0.5 million (Fig. 2). There was a massive rise in the
ratio of unemployed to vacancies from 2.2 to 5.8 (Fig. 4). Despite continued and unprecedented
scal and monetary stimulus from 2009 to 2014, as reected in budget decits up to 11 percent of
GDP and base interest at 0.5 for more than ve years, the private sector enterprises did not create
vacancies to match the growing pool of unemployed. Unemployment rate should have been less than
7 percent now because of these stimulants. From our model results summarised in gures 19 to 22 in
section 5, we expect that the economy eventually will return to its equilibrium unemployment rate
(natural rate of unemployment) bringing inows and outows consistent to the steady state growth
path as the heterogeneity in preferences of households and technologies of rms, fundamental drivers
of demand and supply in the economy have time to adjust to those policy measures after full rounds
of economy-wide income and substitution e¤ects in general equilibrium settings over time.
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Fact 2: There is an evidence of sectoral shift in the structure of employment and causes of
unemployment. Vacancies have mainly been in the distribution, nance and education sectors while
redundancies have been higher than vacancies in the manufacturing, transportation, construction
and other sectors. It is important to consider household and sectoral composition of the economy for
clear understanding of inows to and outows from the unemployment. Model results summarised in
gures 23 and 24 show that education, health, government and professional services will contribute
signicantly to employment creation in coming years.
Fact 3: Evolving trends of productivity, wages, income distribution and sectoral compositions of
the economy inuence not only the transitions between inows and outows but also the dynamic
e¢ ciency and competitiveness of the economy. There are concerns about the growing rate of earning
and income inequality in the UK in recent years as the Gini coe¢ cient has increased from around 28
percent in 1980 to 39 percent in 2011. Inclusion of heterogenous households in the model allows us
to assess redistribution issues particularly in relation to skill and wage di¤erences among household
groups over the model horizon. This itself is a key policy issue of immense interest. Unemployment
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can be very costly if it is centred at certain groups of workers such as low income households.
The burden of unemployment can be reduced by designing policies assisting rms to hire more or
helping job seekers in their search for employment. Sectoral composition as well as short or long
term employment matter. Higher rate of equilibrium unemployment lowers the rate of economic
growth and reduces the level of utility and life time income for all categories of households. Income is
more equally distributed with the policy reforms implemented in this model with the Gini coe¢ cient
at around 30.7 percent. The income distribution pattern by decile based on model results is shown
in Figures in 8 and 10 along with welfare levels in Figures 7 and 9.
Fact 4: The growth in employment or fall in unemployment follows from the growth of the
economy. The number of vacancies are far greater than the number of redundancies. This means
the rate of job creation is higher than the rate of job destruction in the UK, as is evident from
consistent gaps between vacancies and redundancies in the growing UK economy (Fig. 3). This
fact matches well with a negatively sloped Beveridge curve for the UK as seen from our estimates1 .
A simple regression of the change in vacancy (v) on change in unemployment rate (u) in UK
for 2001:5 to 2012:2 yields:
v =  0:288  0:152u
t : ( 0:366) ( 5:70)
R2 = 0:20; F (1; 128) = 32:4 (0:00) ; T = 130
During the same period regressing the change in vacancy on ination () in UK yields:
v = 4:01  2:37
t : (2:09) ( 3:25)
R2 = 0:08; F (1; 128) = 10:6 (0:00) ; T = 130
Unemployment is lower during the expansionary phase of business cycle when rms create more
jobs and hire; during the contractionary phase when rms are not able to create more vacancies.
We show long run business cycle e¤ects based on model results in Figures 25 to 28.
A steady fall in the unemployment rate from 1990 to 2007 was possible because of output
growth that balanced the number of vacancies to that of redundancies. In contrast the increase
in unemployment rate from 5 percent in 2007 to 8.1 percent in 2011 was due to the recession.
Pissarides (2013) attributes 19 percent fall in the unemployment to the growth rate of the economy.
In the monthly data from 2001 to 2008, the three percent gap between the unemployment rate
and vacancy rate is an indication to the natural rate of unemployment. The net vacancy had
remained about 400 thousands each year and with 1.6 million people unemployed but the vacancy
unemployment gap increased substantially after the recession in 2008 (Fig. 2). Vacancies per 100
jobs has reduced from 2.5 to 1.5 in the current recession.
1 see Chesher and Lancaster (1983) and Lancaster (1979) for more sophisticated econometric methods based on
hazard functions and duration analysis.
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Fig. 5: Beveridge Curve for the UK Fig. 6: Wage Curve for the UK
Next section introduces a general equilibrium model and concepts of unemployment rate, wage
rate and wage curve as found in the equilibrium unemployment and job search literature. The
calibration and computation procedure of the model are presented in section 4 with analysis of
results in section 5 and conclusions in section 6 followed by the list of references at the end.
3 General Equilibrium Model with Unemployment
The economy consists of households h1, .,.,h10 indexed according to their levels of income2 and
rms i1 to iN representing the major industries3 that supply goods and services produced using
labour and capital inputs. Both of them solve an innite horizon problem, ftg10 approximated
here by a terminal period t = T which is the nal year of the 21st century. The major objective
of households is to maximise lifetime expected utility (EU) against their life time expected budget
constraints (EBC). Firms are primarily concerned in maximising expected prots over the model
horizon. The government sector provides public goods and transfers, nancing them by taxes on
income, consumption and production. The savings of households are channeled into investment
driving capital accumulation across sectors. Growth of the capital stock and the labour force
along with continuos adjustments in the prices of goods and services, drive the dynamics of the
economy. In contrast to full employment general equilibrium models, this model allows long term
equilibrium unemployment rate determined by inows into and outows from unemployment as
given by transition probabilities from employment to unemployment (separation rate) or from
employment to unemployment (job nding rate). The under-utilisation of labour force available
for production in this manner results in the loss of output to the economy and loss of utility to
households but it cannot be avoided as it is the main feature of the dynamic process of a modern
2Derived from the ONSReference Tables "The e¤ects of taxes and benets on household income, 2009/10."
3Agriculture, Production, Construction, Distribution, Information and communication, Finnance and insurance,
Real estate, Professional and support activities, Government, Health and Education, Other Services.
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economy. This is the reason why it is necessary to integrate the equilibrium unemployment in line
of Pissarides (1979), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000, 2011) into the general
equilibrium model for evaluating impacts of equilibrium unemployment in the economy4 .
3.1 Heterogeneous Household preferences and demand for goods.
Individuals in type h household are endowed with L
h
0 amount of active time and K
h
0 of capital
stock in the initial period t = 0 (for simplicity it is assumed that a household type h represents
all types of individuals in that category from now on). While the total time endowment has an
exogenous growth process as L
h
t = L
h
0e
nt with growth rate n, capital accumulation results from
the consumption saving decision of households and investment decision of rms and given by the
accumulation equation in (15). In general the intertemporal optimisation process guides the process
of capital accumulation and labour supply but there are further issues and complications in the
job market because of three states. At each period t, each individual is either employed (SEht )
or unemployed (SUht ) or inactive (SI
h
t ). Those who are employed are in SE
h
t state and allocate
time between work
 
LSht

and leisure
 
lht

as guided by the real wage rates in relation to the real
price system of the economy. Work generates wage income
 
wht LS
h
t

which is normally more than
the job-seeker allowances
 
Rht

that these individuals would receive if unemployed in SUht state
or basic need related transfers
 
Rht

if in the SIht state. Those who are unemployed divide time
into leisure
 
lht

and job search
 
JSht

activities. How intensive is their search e¤orts then depends
not only on its contribution to job nding rate
 
fht

but also on the amount of transfer
 
Rht

they
could claim by remaining in unemployment state. Uncertainties in job markets implies that with
probability sht each worker may lose the current job and transit from SE
h
t either to SU
h
t becoming
unemployed or get out of the labour force to state SIht with probability ss
h
t . Each unemployed
person can get a job with probability fht as a result of economy wide matching process between job
seekers and rms with vacancies or transit to inactive state SIht with probability ff
h
t . On the other
hand households in the inactive state can enter into employment or unemployment by transition
rates ieht and iu
h
t . Thus the matching function in this paper takes account of these transitions
emerging from heterogeneity in preferences of households and in technology of rms. This set up
is consistent to the micro-foundations implied in Pissarides (1979 and 2011) where the gains from
job creation are split between workers and rms according to their bargaining power in it. Some
estimates for these parameters are found in the literature. The labour market survey (ONS) shows
that on average 76.8 percent of 16-64 population was economically active in the UK in the last
4This integration can be seen as the partial fullment of Milton Freidmans research program set out in his
American Economic Association presidential address in 1968, when he dened "..The natural rate of unemployment
... is the level that would be ground out by the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations, provided there
is embedded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labour and commodity markets, including market
imperfections, stochastic variability in demands and supplies, the costs of gathering information about job vacancies,
and labor availabilities, the costs of mobility, and so on.
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two decades. This implies inactivity rate of 23.2 percent. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008) from
the LFS and Smith (2011) from the BHPS found sht to vary between 0.35 to 0.41, f
h
t between
0.36 and 0.31, iuht between 0.133 and 0.016 and ss
h
t between 0.151 and 0.09 in the UK. Pissarides
(2013) provides a very clear intuition why these rates vary over time as an economy close to the full
employment suddenly enters into recession precipitating the fall in demand for labour and increase
in unemployment. He matches movement of equilibrium along or outside the Beveridge curve with
empirical evidence in explaining cyclical, structural and institutional problems relating to job search
and matching processes and public policies in the UK and Germany in comparison to other states of
EU and the USA. With these understandings on the underlying process we now proceed to specify
the general equilibrium model with unemployment.
Households care for the expected life time utility
 
EUh0

from consumption of goods
 
Chi;t

and
leisure
 
lht

. They receive income supplying labour
 
LSht

and capital services
 
Kht

to rms which
pay them according to their marginal productivities. Lower income households receive transfer 
Rht

from the government that is nanced by the public revenue collected by taxing high income
households. Given the subjective discount factor (0 < h < 1) each h type of household maxi-
mizes utility subject to its budget constraint that sets present value of its expected income and
expenditure. Thus the demand side problem of households facing above three labour market states,
S =

SEht ; SU
h
t ; SI
h
t
	
, could be stated as:
max EUh0 =
1X
t=0
SX
s=1
h
t
Uht;s
 
Cht;s; l
h
t;s

ht;s (1)
subject to the life time expected budget constraint (EBC):
1X
t=0
SX
s=1
NX
i=1
Pi;t
 
1 + tchi

Chi;t;s
h
t;s =
1X
t=0
SX
s=1
(1  th)

wht
 
1  twhLSht + rt (1  tk)Kht +Rht ht;s
(2)
Here Pi;t; wht ; rt are the prices of commodities, wage of h type of labour and rental rate of capital;
twh is labour input tax rate, tki is capital input tax rate and th is tax rate on household income.
Then ht;s is the probability of being in state s at time t with the base year actual proportions for
the UK being the initial probabilities h0;s in the model implementation. As each household h is
certainly in one of these three states in each time t and these probabilities sum to one,
SP
s
ht;s = 1
for each t. Each household with time endowment, L
h
t = L
h
0e
nt which grows by n between t and
t   1, divides it into the labour supply  LSht  and leisure  lht  if it belongs to the working state,
between job search
 
JSht

and leisure
 
lht

if unemployed and puts all in leisure, lht;si = L
h
t;si; if
in the inactive state. These inactive individuals rely on capital income and non-jobseeker benet
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payments to meet their expenses on consumption. Utility maximisation decision leads to the choice
of Chi;t;se, l
h
t and LS
h
t = L
h
t   lht for households in status SEht . Those who are unemployed (in
status SUht ), get income from capital
 
rt (1  tk)Kht

or transfers
 
Rht

and choose Chi;t;su, leisure 
lht

and hours in job search
 
JSht

. There is a logit relation between job nding rate
 
fht

to job
search e¤orts, fht =
1
1+e
 JSh
t 1
. For those who are trapped in benet, Rht in the (2) is the form of
benets for the fulllment of basic needs paid by the state (e.g. allowances for sickness, disability,
war veterans, widower or state pensions). The balance in the labour market in these three labour
market conditions are:
LSht;se + l
h
t;se = L
h
t ; JS
h
t;su + l
h
t;su = L
h
t ; l
h
t;si = L
h
t;si; L
h
t = L
h
0e
nt (3)
As a household h can transit from one state to another it is important to evaluate all these
three states for each household while evaluating their life time EBC (2). In a dynamic labour
market the probability of remaining in a particular state ht;s itself is an autoregressive process and
function of inows and outows among states, S. If a person is in the employment state with
probability ht 1;se in period t  1 and this probability is reduced by transitions to unemployment 
SUht

and inactive
 
SIht

states roughly by ht 1;s
 
sht + ss
h
t

but rises as individuals transit from
unemployment and inactive state to employment state by fht 
h
t;su+ie
h
t 
h
t;si. Thus the probability of
being in a particular labour market condition itself varies over time. While a particular household
is in one particular state s at a given point of time but it transits to di¤erent labour market states
as time progresses. Probability of being in employed state is:
ht;se = 
h
t 1;se   ht 1;se
 
sht + ss
h
t

+ fht 
h
t 1;su + ie
h
t 
h
t 1;si (4)
Probability of being in unemployment state is:
ht;su = 
h
t 1;su   ht 1;su
 
fht + ff
h
t

+ sht 
h
t 1;se + iu
h
t 
h
t 1;si (5)
and probability of being in the inactive state is:
ht;si = 
h
t 1;si   ht 1;si
 
ieht + iu
h
t

+ ssht 
h
t 1;se + ff
h
t 
h
t 1;su: (6)
Policy makers inuence allocation of resources by choosing the VAT rate on commodities
 
tchi

,
labour input tax rate
 
twh

, capital input tax rate (tki) and the tax rate on household income (th)
hence determining the relative prices of commodities and factors
 
Pi;t; w
h
t ; rt

. The policy measures
eventually will inuence the movement across states with probabilities given in (4), (5) and (6).
These policy rates are assumed to remain at the base year rates in model implementation.
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3.2 Production technology and supply of goods
The production technology of rms is nested and di¤ers across sectors. They operate either the
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) or Cobb-Douglas production technology depending on
substitutability of inputs according to their prices. They hire workers and capital stocks from
households. The objective of a rm in the jth sector of the economy is to maximise the present
value of prots subject to production technology constraints. The unit revenue function is a constant
elasticity transformation (CET) composite of the unit price of domestic sales and the unit price
of exports. The unit costs are divided between value-added (payments to labour and capital) and
intermediate inputs (domestic and imported) as in Bhattarai (2007b):
max j;t =

(1  i)PD
y 1
y
j;t + iPE
y 1
y
j;t
 1
y 1
  iPYj;t   di
1X
t=0
ai;jPi;t   mi
1X
t=0
ami;jPi;t (7)
where: j;t is the unit prot of activity in sector j; PEj;t is the export price of good j, PDj;t is
the domestic price of commodity j; PYj;t is the price of value added per unit of output in activity j;
Yj;t = 	i

iL
i
i;t + (1  i)Kii;t
 1
i , y is a transformation elasticity parameter; Pi;t is the price of
nal goods used as intermediate goods; i is the share parameter for exports in total production; i
is the share of costs paid to labour and capital; di is the cost share of domestic intermediate inputs;
mi is the cost share of imported intermediate inputs; ai;j are input-output coe¢ cients for domestic
supply of intermediate goods; ami;j are input-output coe¢ cients for imported supply of intermediate
goods. Their investment activities, which depend on sector specic protability conditions result
in accumulation of sector specic capital net of depreciation. A greater amount of capital enhances
productivity of labour and raises the wage rate. Employment in each sector is the CES aggregation
over all skill categories h according to Li;t =
HP
h=1

LSh
lh 1
lh 1
i;t
 1
lh 1
where the supply of households
match the employment across industries, LSht =
NP
i=1
LShi;t. The size of employment in industry i ,
Li;t is the result of matching process between existing workers and new entrants and is subject to
uctuations due to job separation or nding rates across sectors for each type of skill h.
3.3 Equilibrium unemployment (vacancies, job search and matching)
As stated above in section 3.1, the transition from employment to unemployment or to inactive
states and from unemployment to employment or to inactive states depend very much on the het-
erogeneity of preferences and technology determined by demand and supply conditions in the econ-
omy. This process is shown in the equilibrium unemployment model where unemployed households
do not contribute in production but take non-labour income and transfers for their consumption.
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Inows and outows in unemployment depend on the generosity of benets, the bargaining power
of workers and unions, information about the vacancies and applicants, and the competitiveness of
the economy.
The phenomenon of equilibrium unemployment results from the interaction among N number of
rms and unions (representingH number of households) which bargain over wages and employment.
Following the market signals of demand and relative prices and costs of inputs, prot maximising
rms create vacancies for specic tasks and hire workers when they nd suitable candidates for
these jobs. Similarly there are workers seeking jobs that match their skills and others who quit jobs
and join the pool of unemployed who may choose to quit jobs and become unemployed. Market
specic idiosyncratic shocks cause such entries and exits in the labour market. Equilibrium unem-
ployment and wage rates result from a Nash-bargain between workers and rms. Whether the rate
of unemployment falls or rises depends on the relative proportion of entry and exit into the labour
market.
Matching and bargaining functions across all N industries are key elements determining equi-
librium unemployment and are modeled here following Pissarides (1979, 2000 and 2011). The
Matching function (Beveridge curve) gives equilibrium conditions in the labour market balancing
entry and exit from unemployment by aggregating sector and skill specic vacancies
 
V hi;t

and
unemployment
 
UNhi;t

with job creation as:
Mt = M (Vt; UNt) = V
t
t UN
(1 t)
t (8)
where Mt; Vt and UNt denote the aggregate number of matching, vacancies and unemployment
respectively among job seekers at time t and aggregate variables are geometric means of household
level variables5 . The matching parameter t is between zero and one and varies over time. It can be
adjusted for prosperous period when there are more vacancies than job seekers or in recession when
there are more unemployed than vacancies. In steady state it should be about 0.5 to reect the
balance between job creation and job destruction. Heterogeneity in the labour market is reected
by sector and skill specic Mhi;t; V
h
i;t and UN
h
i;t. These capture the labour market conditions where
production sectors su¤er from shortages of certain skills while facing abundance of other skills.
In each case job seekers and employers bargain over expected earnings by maximising the Nash-
product
 
NPhi;t

of the bargaining game over the di¤erence between the earnings from work (Whi;t)
than in being unemployed (UNhi;t) and earnings to rms from lled
 
Jhi;t

and vacant jobs
 
V hi;t

.
NPhi;t =
 
Whi;t   UNhi;t
hb  Jhi;t   V hi;t1 hb (9)
5Vt =
N

i=1
V hi;t;UNt =
N

i=1
UNhi;t;Mt =
N

i=1
Mhi;t =
N

i=1
M

V hi;t; UN
h
i;t

.
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Market imperfections in the labour market create opportunity of gains from bargains which is
divided between rms and workers as indicated by parameter hb that can assume any value be-
tween zero and one, reecting the relative strength of unions (workers) over rms in such bargains.
Symmetric solution of this satises joint prot maximisation condition as:
 
Whi;t   UNhi;t

= hb
 
Jhi;t +W
h
i;t   V hi;t   UNhi;t

(10)
In aggregate the job search model can be explained using three simple equations as summarised
by Pissarides (1979, 2000).
First, for each skill type h the dynamics of unemployment depends on the rate of job destruction,
ht
 
1  unht

, and the rate of job creation, ht q
 
ht

unht as un
h
t = 
h
t
 
1  unht
   ht q  ht unht .
The steady state equilibrium implied by this is:
unht =
ht
ht + 
h
t q
 
ht
 ; unT = T
T + T q (T )
(11)
where ht is the rate of idiosyncratic shock of job destruction of household type h and 
h
t is the ratio of
vacancy to the unemployment and q
 
ht

is the probability of lling a job with a suitable candidate
through the matching process explained in (8). Then unT is the equilibrium unemployment rate
average across all households expressed in terms of avarages of ht 
h
t and q (T ) given by T , T
and q (T ) respectively.
Secondly the upward sloping wage curve in (ht ; w
h
t ) space shows positive links between the
reservation wage (zht ) the price of product p and cost of hiring (
h
t c
h
t ) implying higher wage rates
for tighter labour markets as:
whi;t = z
h
t
 
1  hb

+ hb pt
 
1 + ht c
h
t

(12)
Finally there is a downward sloping job creation curve wht = pt 
 
rt + 
h
t
 ptcht
q(ht )
; where pt is the
price of product, wht the wage rate, and
 
rt + 
h
t
 ptcht
q(ht )
, is the cost of hiring and ring. It shows the
possibility of job creation at lower wage rates and creation of fewer jobs at higher wage rates. The
optimal job creation (demand for labour curve) occurs when rms balance the marginal revenue
product of labour to wage and hiring and ring costs6 .
Derivations of these equations from value functions of employed and unemployed workers and
from occupied and non-occupied vacancies along with the union-rm wage bargaining is based on
Pissarides (2000). It is important to consider the general equilibrium impacts of these vacancies,
6See Nash (1953), Calvo (1979), Diamond and Maskin (1979), Nickell (1982), Lockwood and Manning (1989),
Layard and Nickell (1990), Dri¢ ll and Schultz (1992), Blanchower and Oswald (1994) and Dixon and Rankin
(1994) for bargaining for wage and employment.
13
redundancies and unemployment on the growth of output, employment, relative prices, allocation
of factors between private and public sectors and welfare of various categories of households in the
economy. Whilst the frictional unemployment literature ( Smith (2011), Zannetti (2010), Krause
et al. (2008)) suggests that some degree of unemployment can make an economy more exible
and allows a smooth process of adjustment, a high rate of persistent structural unemployment may
result in the lower level of output and living standards. In general the preferences of households
between the current and future consumption and leisure and labour supply determines the overall
dynamics of the economy. The tax and transfer system, internal and external competition, tastes
and technological factors inuence on the structure of the economy.
3.4 Trade arrangements
The economy is open. Exports and imports are guided by the ratio of domestic to foreign prices
and balance in the long-run. Total absorption in the economy is given by the standard Armington
function aggregating domestic supplies and imports as:
Ai;t = 	

diD
y 1
y
i;t + 
m
i MM
m 1
m
i;t
 m
y 1
(13)
where Ai;t is the CES aggregate of domestic supplies Di;t and import supplies MMi;t for each
sector, di is the share of domestically produced goods, 
m
i is the share of good i imports, m is
the elasticity of substitution in the aggregate supply function, and 	 is the shift parameter of
the aggregate supply function. The value of exports (PEi;tEi;t) balances to the value of imports
(PMi;tMMi;t) over the model horizon, implying zero net capital inows (F = 0) in the economy.
1X
t=0
NX
i=1
PEi;tEi;t  
1X
t=0
NX
i=1
PMi;tMMi;t = F = 0 (14)
3.5 Drivers of the dynamics in the economy
Dynamics of the economy are driven by the accumulation of capital and growth in the labour supply
subject to equilibrium unemployment. Capital stock evolves naturally with its initial and boundary
conditions:
Ii;t = Ki;t   (1  )Ki;t 1 (15)
As stated above there is an exogenous process of growth of time endowment, L
h
t ; L
h
t = L
h
0;e
nt.
Those who are in employment drive the production process of the economy. The labour market
dynamics depends on six transition rates ssht and s
h
t and f
h
t and ff
h
t and ie
h
t and iu
h
t and transition
probabilities as given by (4), (5) and (6) above. Changes in these six transition rate parameters,
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because of the shocks in demand and supply situations in the public, private or the external sectors
of the economy, are the major causes of uctuations in labour supply and output, employment 
SEht

and unemployment
 
SUht

and in and out of labour force or being in active or inactive
states
 
SIht

in the economy.
3.6 Public sector
At every period government provides public services to households and pays for them using taxes.
Such tax transfer system inuences choices of households and creates distortions in the system.
Government provides G amounts of public services, from (gi;t) subsectors including education,
health, security, law and order, to households. Thus the government consumption is represented
by:
Gt =
NX
i=1
gi;t (16)
It collects revenue (RVt) from direct taxes on capital

HP
h=1
rt  tk Kht

and labour income

HP
h=1
wht  twh  LSht

and indirect taxes on consumption

HP
h=1
Pi;t  tchi  Chi;t

.
RVt =
HX
h=1
Pi;ttc
h
i C
h
i;t +
HX
h=1
rttkK
h
t +
HX
h=1
wht tw
hLSht
Budget is balanced over the model horizon:
1X
t=1
Gt =
1X
t=1
 
RVt +
HX
h=1
Rht
!
(17)
The optimal level of public sector balances benets and costs from the public sector activities.
3.7 Conditions for the Intertemporal General Equilibrium
Given the initial endowments of labour and capital, the intertemporal dynamics in the economy
requires fullling ve equilibrium conditions. For each period there is a balance between demand
and supply for each sector i as the output (Yi;t) equals to consumption

HP
h=1
Chi;t

, investment (Ii;t),
exports (Ei;t), public consumption (gi;t) and resources spent on the matching process (iMi;t) as
in Merz (1995):
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Yi;t =
HX
h=1
Chi;t + Ii;t + Ei;t + gi;t + iMi;t (18)
and for each type of labour and the capital stock.
These equilibrium conditions should be consistent to intertemporal constraints of households,
rms, the government and the international balance of the economy. Each household can engage
in intertemporal lending and borrowing but its present value of expenditure should equal to the
present value of income as given in (2).
Similarly each rm can nance investment by retained earning, bonds or equities but the ex-
pected present value of revenue should equal expected present value of the cost
TX
t=0
Pi;tYi;t =
TX
t=0
"
rt (1  tk)Ki;t +
HX
h=i
wht L
h
i;t
#
(19)
The government may have decits or surplus in its budget but it must ensure that present value of
public spending equals the present value of revenue as given in (17)
The economy may have balance of payment surplus or capital outows or inows but the present
value of exports must equal the present value of imports (F = 0) as given in (14). Exchange rate
appreciation (depreciations) of the home currency makes this happen.
The economy will converge to the steady state equilibrium unemployment rate for aggregate
(for each type h worker-household) at the terminal period as given in (11).
The capital stock at the terminal period will be:
Ii;T = (gi + i)Ki;T 1 (20)
These conditions should full the basic Euler equation of optimisation that states that marginal
utility of consumption or marginal product of a factor between two periods should equal in present
value terms [Uh
0
t
 
Cht ; l
h
t

= hUh
0
t+1
 
Cht+1; l
h
t+1

and @Yj;t@Kj;t =
@Yj;t+1
@Kj;t+1
1
1+rt
or @Yj;t
@Lhj;t
=
@Yj;t+1
@Lhj;t+1
1
1+wht
].
In addition these solutions should satisfy the initial (starting) and terminal (steady state) condi-
tions. In general as Hicks (1939) had mentioned that the relative prices of commodities and factors
of production keep adjusting until the demand and supply balance. For a model with T years and
N sectors such equilibrium is given by the system of T:N(N   1) relative prices expressed in terms
of preferences, technologies and policy instruments that clear all goods and factor markets. In the
Walrasian system given the vector of prices, pt = (p1;t; p2;t;; :::; pj;t:::pn;t) demand for commodities
are expressed in terms of the price vector Xdj;t = X
d
j;t (pt) = X
d
j (p1;t; p2;t;; :::; pj;t:::pn;t) and sup-
ply functions dened similarly Xsj;t = X
s
j;t (pt) = X
s
j (p1;t; p2;t;; :::; pj;t:::pn;t) : The excess demand
functions E (pt) = Xdj;t (pt)   Xsj (pt) reect the gap between demand and supply for each com-
modity for j = 1; 2; : : : : : : :n. Economy has n excess demand functions. The general equilibrium
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is a price vector, pt , such that p

t > 0, if E (pt )  0 pt = 0. The excess demand functions are
single valued continuous functions, bounded from below E (pt)  bt for all pt and are homoge-
nous of degree zero in all prices E (pt) = pt. Only relative prices matter to satisfy the Walras
law; pt:E (pt) =
nP
i=1
pi;t:Ei (pt) = 0 for all pt  0: If the excess demand functions satisfy above
properties then, the existence of the general equilibrium is guaranteed by xed point theorems.
The xed equilibrium point is found in Arrow-Debreau system by continuous transformation of the
non-empty convex set onto itself pt  ! E (pt )  ! pt . Given the linear homogeneity properties of
demand and supply functions, equilibrium is stable and unique.
4 General equilibrium solution procedure
Optimal allocation of resources in the model economy requires fulllment of the above intertemporal
equilibrium conditions in goods and factor markets in addition to the general equilibrium in each
period. Abstract theoretical proofs of existence, uniqueness and stability of the dynamic general
equilibrium in the model discussed above requires use of Arrow-Debreu (1954) theorem or algorithm.
Whalley (1977) had applied Scarfs simplex algorithm of the form By = bw to prove existence of
equilibrium in the presence of taxes (here B is the coe¢ cient matrix, y is a vector of endogenous
variables and bw is a vector of endowments). Rutherford (1998) applied discrete approximation of
innite horizon approach to compute long-rung growth and welfare (see also Mercenier and Philippe
(1994)). In this paper we compute the dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogenous
households and rms taking Pissarides (1979, 1985, 2011) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
type equilibrium unemployment as an outcome of matching of vacancies and unemployment and
bargaining between unions and rms in each period over the model horizon.
The solution procedure of this model now can be characterised in terms of optimal quantities
Q :

Ut; U
h
t ; C
h
t ; l
h
t ; C
h
i;t; LS
h
i;t;i;t; Yj;t; Vi;t;Kj;t; Lj;t; Ii;t; Di;t; Ei;t;Mi;t; Ai;t; RVt; Gt
	T
t
(21)
and the relative prices
P :

Pi;t; PYi;t; PDi;t; PEi;t; w
h
t ; ri;t; Ri;t; PEi;t; PMi;t
	T
t
(22)
for each period t up to the model horizon T , and which are determined by the system of parameters
describing the behavior, technology, policy and institutional parameters of the economy.
These prices are consistent to the optimal decisions of households and rms given the set of poli-
cies in operation and are determined by the parameters of preferences
 
hc ; 
h
l ; 
h
u; 
h
c ; 
h
l ; 
h
u; 
h
ucl

,
gross production
 
yi ;  i; i; 
d
i ; ai;t

; value added (p; 
p
i ; i) ; trade
 
di ; 
m
i ; m

and the tax trans-
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fer policies
 
tchi ; tw
h
i ; tki; T
h
t

. Economy starts with the initial capital stock (Ki;0) and is subject
to the exogenous process of evolution of total labour force

LFt =
P
L
h
i;t

, long run steady state
conditions in terms for growth rate, depreciation and the real return on investment across sectors
(gi; i; ri). The working out of the dynamic equilibrium process through elimination of excess de-
mands across all markets, fQgTt : EDi;t = D fPgTt   S fPgTt = 0, results in the system of relative
prices being determined simultaneously with all these parameters taking supply, demand and policy
side interactions in the economy.
Allocations of resources and welfare obtained through these price vectors are optimal in the
sense that these meet optimal conditions for households and rms. Whilst long run cycles are
generated because of shocks in any one or a subset of these parameters (see Table 1) the policy
generated shocks are the ones that matter most in policy analyses.
The model is benchmarked to the reference path of the evolving economy for years, t = 2009
to T = 2101 with ten categories of households fh1; :; :; h10g and ten sectors fi1; :; :; i10g with the
production and demand function parameters calibrated from the ten sector input-output table
aggregated from the 111 sector input-output table available in the Input-output (IO) Table 2009
from the O¢ ce of the National Statistics (ONS) of the UK (Table 2).
The distribution of income among categories of households is obtained from the ONS Reference
Tables-"The e¤ects of taxes and benets on household income, 2009/10." These income shares are
also applied to decompose the consumption shares by sectors as shown in Tables 3 and 4. VAT rates,
corporation tax rate and household income tax rate are taken from the current budget statements.
Imports and exports by sectors as well as the production taxes are also taken from the IO-Table.
Table 1: Key parameters of general equilibrium model with equilibrium unemployment in the UK
Parameters hc gi;t r 
h
ucl i;t y k m t
h
c tw
h
i
Values 1.55 0.02 0.03 0.98 0.02 2.0 1.5 3.0 0.2 0,0.32,0.4, 0.45
The model includes transfers from high income to the low income households in the form of
conditional unemployment and benet system as discussed in Mirrlees et al. (2010), Bhattarai and
Whalley (2009), Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), Blundell (2001) and Hutton and Roucoo
(1999). Households consider intertemporal factors in labour supply with continuous rather than
discrete choice of labour hours. Focus on equilibrium unemployment with heterogeneity of rms
and labour provides deeper understanding of the economy than from single sector long run growth
model such as Basu and Bhattarai (2011). The household side parameters of the model are given
in Table 3.
The model is solved using the Newtonian Path-search Ferris algorithm in the GAMS/MPSGE
(Rutherford, 1998) and has a long horizon of 2009-2101.
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Table 2: Input-output coe¢ cient matrix of UK, 2009 (based on the IO Table from the ONS)
Agri Prod Constr Dist Infcom Finns Rlest Prfspp Ghlthed Othrsrv
Agri 0.0589 0.0109 0.0011 0.0056 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002
Prod 0.0199 0.2490 0.1577 0.2319 0.0787 0.0272 0.0035 0.0351 0.1549 0.0825
Constr 0.0117 0.0040 0.2583 0.0456 0.0099 0.0195 0.0550 0.0062 0.0147 0.0097
Dist 0.0268 0.0147 0.0156 0.2111 0.0245 0.0606 0.0039 0.0270 0.0316 0.0229
Infcom 0.0062 0.0054 0.0065 0.0638 0.0953 0.0596 0.0071 0.0295 0.0216 0.0431
Finins 0.0237 0.0127 0.0197 0.0392 0.0164 0.0940 0.0251 0.0176 0.0148 0.0152
Rlest 0.0038 0.0013 0.0089 0.0523 0.0070 0.0178 0.0064 0.0051 0.0117 0.0089
Prfspp 0.0217 0.0215 0.0757 0.1525 0.1190 0.1213 0.0256 0.2286 0.0722 0.1553
Ghlthed 0.0009 0.0021 0.0068 0.0184 0.0067 0.0116 0.0190 0.0270 0.1051 0.0097
Othrsrv 0.0021 0.0008 0.0005 0.0060 0.0186 0.0043 0.0003 0.0066 0.0106 0.0820
Ten s e c t o r s : A g r i (A g r i c u l t u r e ) , p r o f (P r o d u c t io n ) , C o n s t r (C o n s t r u c t io n ) , In f c om ( In fo rm a t io n a n d c om m u n ic a t io n ) ,
F in in s (F in a n c e a n d in s u r a n c e ) , R le s t (R e a l e s t a t e ) , P r f s p p (P r o f e s s io n a l a n d s u p p o r t a c t iv i t i e s ) , D i s t (D i s t r ib u t io n ) ,
G h l t h e d (G ov e r nm e n t ,H e a l t h a n d E d u c a t io n ) , O th r s r v (O th e r S e r v i c e s ) ; D a t a s o u r c e O N S . U K ,
5 Analysis of Results of EU Dynamic CGE Model
Policy experiments are conducted once the model is calibrated to the reference benchmark path
up to 2100 starting from 2009, which assumes that the tax structure of 2009 continues over the
model horizon. Then the tax reform scenarios are based on the reforms on the tax-transfer system
after 2009 including 1) zero tax rate on income of households in the bottom decile, reduction of
income tax rate to 45 percent for the households in top decile and 32 percent income tax rate for
households in the middle income group (Table 3). It also includes transfers to household deciles as
existed in 2011. 2) the corporate tax to 22 percent and the value added tax (VAT) increased from
17.5 percent to 20 percent; 3) production taxes on capital and labour input use are derived from
production taxes and subsidies (s) and margins (MRY ) entries of the input-output table from the
ONS as given in Tables 4.
Model solutions provide a perspective on the evolution of the economy for the entire model
horizon and can be seen as capturing both cycles and growth e¤ects in the medium term (5-10
years) and longer terms (50 to 100 years). They are used to form scenarios of scal policies or to
assess the robustness of the elasticities in consumption and production that reect the reactions
from the private sector to the shocks either from policy initiatives or from the technology. What
happens to the economy if system of vacancies and job matching process becomes more e¢ cient?
Which of the several taxes is more e¢ cient or which set of policy alternatives is better for the higher
level of utilities and lifetime income of the households and for the growth of the economy? How does
the equilibrium unemployment evolve under the current system and how does it compare to the
counter-factual scenarios? How does the distribution of income evolve over time? How sensitive are
the model solutions to the set of intertemporal substitution elasticities between consumption and
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Table 3: Benchmark income and expenditure shares and income tax rates for households, 2009
Income share Consumption share Income tax rate
Deciles h h twhi
h1 0.0281 0.0627 0.0
h2 0.0433 0.0552 0.32
h3 0.0551 0.0624 0.32
h4 0.0669 0.0850 0.32
h5 0.0789 0.0966 0.32
h6 0.0908 0.1067 0.32
h7 0.1081 0.1078 0.32
h8 0.1276 0.1323 0.32
h9 0.1521 0.1409 0.40
h10 0.2493 0.1945 0.45
N o t e : T h e low e s t (h1)t o t h e h ig h e s t in c om e (h10)c a t e g o r i e s .
H o u s e h o ld c a t e g o r i e s : D a t a s o u r c e O N S . U K
leisure or to the intra-temporal elasticities of substitution in consumption, production and trade?
For above reasons this dynamic general equilibrium process contains very realistic micro-foundation
to macro level policy analysis than is common in the DSGE models.
Only a few selective model scenarios are discussed below and details of model solutions are
available upon request. In a nutshell the main results of this model could be summarised as follows:
1. The level of utility for each household h rises over the model horizon, i:e: Uh1 < U
h
2 < ::: < U
h
T .
Whilst the levels of utilities of all households rises over time, the utility of richer households
rises faster than that of the poorer households as shown in the Figure 7. The impacts of re-
distributive tax-transfer policies are clear as shown by the lifetime income distribution among
households, generating overall gini coe¢ cient of 30.7 percent in counter factual. Changes
in income and position of households in deciles in counterfactual are illustrated in Figures
8 and 10. The overall welfare index in the counter-factual scenarios declines relative to its
benchmark values because of distortions (Fig. 9).
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Table 4: Benchmark production tax-subsidy rate, shares of labour and capital income, imports and
margins in total output and sectoral shares of output
s
wL
Y
rK
Y
MM
Y
MR
Y
Yi
Y
Agri -0.0900 0.0932 0.2175 0.2506 0.1463 0.0116
Prod 0.0035 0.0934 0.0656 0.2701 0.2449 0.3694
Constr 0.0037 0.2129 0.1771 0.0063 0.0491 0.0705
Dist 0.0348 0.5599 0.2203 0.1028 -0.7443 0.0915
Infcom 0.0066 0.2861 0.1724 0.0755 0.0833 0.0527
Finins 0.0116 0.2576 0.3054 0.0535 -0.0441 0.0701
Rlest -0.0030 0.0383 0.4741 0.0051 0.1137 0.0564
Prfspp 0.0034 0.2849 0.1543 0.1008 0.0737 0.1066
Ghlthed 0.0008 0.4801 0.0710 0.0048 0.0060 0.1456
Othrsrv 0.0144 0.3653 0.1373 0.0710 -0.0177 0.0256
N o t e : s : t a x a n d s u b s id y in p r o d u c t io n
wL
Y : :
l a b o u r s h a r e
rK
Y c a p i t a l s h a r e
MM
Y : im p o r t G D P ra t io
MR
Y : r a t io o f t r a d e a n d t r a n s p o r t m a r g in t o G D P
Yi
Y : s e c t o r a l o u t p u t s h a r e s . D a t a s o u r c e O N S . U K
Fig. 7: Utility levels of households Fig. 8: Level of lifetime income of households (000)
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F ig . 9 :To t a l w e l f a r e r e la t iv e t o t h e b e n chm a rk F ig . 1 0 : D i s t r ib u t io n o f l i f e t im e in c om e im p l i e d b y t h e m o d e l s o lu t io n s
2. The level of GDP rises steadily as a result of the steady increase in the labour supply and
capital stock (Fig. 11-13), as does the aggregate consumption of households (Fig. 14). How-
ever it was noticed that the current reforms slightly distort the economy causing the counter
factual levels to be lower than in the benchmark reference path.
Fig. 11: Evolution of demand for labour Fig. 12: Evolution of GDP
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Fig. 13: Evolution of capital stock Fig. 14: Evolution of total private consumption
3. The public transfer programme requires revenue to be higher than public spending (Fig.
15). However, higher taxes result in the higher prices of goods and services (Fig. 16). The
general price index rises for the economy (Fig. 17). These distortionary taxes raise the cost of
production and lower the level of output in all 10 sectors, with the construction sector being
hardest hit in this process. While maintaining transfer requires revenue to be higher than
public spending it has negative impacts on prices and output. As discussed in the literature
[Mirrlees et al. (2010), Bhattarai and Whalley (2009) and Blundell et al.(2008)], the economic
costs of transfer programmes are very high.
F ig . 1 5 : R a t io o f p u b l i c s p e n d in g ,a n d r e v e nu e r e la t iv e t o t h e b e n chm a rk F ig . 1 6 : R e la t iv e p r i c e s o f g o o d s a n d s e r v i c e s r e la t iv e t o t h e b e n chm a rk
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F ig . 1 7 : P r i c e in d e x u n d e r r e f o rm r e la t iv e t o t h e b e n chm a rk F ig . 1 8 : C a p i t a l s t o ck in c o u n t e r f a c t u a l r e la t iv e t o t h e b e n chm a rk
4. The impact of the tax reforms on equilibrium unemployment are very small if the matching
technology works well in the system (Fig. 21). Better information technology can make
matching smoother so that number of matches increase according to number of vacancies
and unemployment in the system. If such process could work in the economy the issue
of equilibrium unemployment does not seem to matter much in the long run for the long
run growth. Intertemporal choice between labour-leisure and consumption, and saving and
investment, as well as the technological advancements are more important factors driving the
long run growth of the production sectors and the economy. The evolution of matching and
unemployment levels resulting from the complex mechanism of demand and supply processes
in the economy are shown in Figures 19 and 20. Active policies for job search and matching
result in lower equilibrium unemployment rate the matching ratio in the counter factual (Fig.
21) but there are uctuations in the matching ratios because of cyclical factors in the economy
(Fig. 22). Model results summarised in gures 23 and 24 show that education, health,
government and professional services will contribute signicantly to employment creation in
coming years.
Fig. 19: Equilibrium matching of jobs Fig. 20: Numbers unemployed in equilibrium
24
Fig. 21: Equilibrium unemployment rate Fig. 22: Job matching unemployment ratio
Fig. 23: Labour supply by sectors Fig. 24: Labour supply by sectors
5. Long run business cycles caused by policy changes are represented in Figures 25-28. It is
obvious that more shocks to model parameters, listed in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 in line of the
DSGE models, will bring more of these cycles in output, consumption, labour supply and
welfare and in patterns of income distribution. In our view the DSGE literature needs to
move towards introducing heterogeneity among households and rms as in this paper to be
more realistic in reecting economic activity as a whole.
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The above results are indicative of the model solutions. Flexibility of goods and factor markets
as reected in the intra-temporal and inter-temporal elasticities of substitution are very important
determinants for the time paths of variables. Knock-on e¤ects of changes in one part of the system
can have very extensive impacts in others. Great care is necessary using economic theories in setting
up policies and in calibrating/choosing parameters before computing the model and interpreting
the model solutions.
6 Conclusion
An attempt is made to incorporate the Pissarides (1979, 2011) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
type of equilibrium unemployment into a computable dynamic general equilibrium model to eval-
uate the impact of matching technology in the long-run growth and level of utilities and lifetime
income of households in the UK economy. Dynamic interactions among heterogenous consumers
and producers generate interesting results. Utility of all households increase over time as levels of
output, capital stock and labour supply rise over time. The model reproduces income distribution
patterns and the Gini coe¢ cients as one would expect from the analysis of the real data. Taxes
create distortions and raise the prices of commodities in all sectors when taxes and transfers rise
relative to the benchmark. The price index rises steadily, economy becomes more expensive, costs
of production rise and output falls steadily relative to that in the benchmark economy in almost all
sectors of the economy. The level of equilibrium unemployment rises but the job matching increases
at a faster space in the policy reform scenario causing equilibrium unemployment to decline. Bet-
ter matching technology lowers the rate of equilibrium unemployment rate as vacancies are lled
more e¢ ciently. Long run growth and redistribution are more sensitive to exibility of markets as
reected in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption and sub-
stitutability of commodities in consumption and between capital and labour in production across
sectors. More e¢ cient matching technology improves e¢ ciency in consumption and production,
enhances growth and raises e¤ectiveness in achieving the equity and growth objectives of the tax
and transfer system existing in the UK. This is the rst paper that includes the search and match-
ing model and equilibrium unemployment with heterogenous households and rms explicitly in this
way in a dynamic computable general equilibrium model with taxes for the UK economy.
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